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Abstract. In this paper we present a theorem proving methodology for
a restricted but significant fragment of the conditional language made
up of (boolean combinations of) conditional statements with unnested
antecedents. The method is based on the possible world semantics for
conditional logics. The label formalism introduced in [AG94,ABGR96] to
account for the semantics of normal modal logics is easily adapted to the
semantics of conditional logics by simply indexing labels with formulas.
The inference rules are provided by the propositional system KE+ — a
tableau-like analytic proof system devised to be used both as a refutation
and a direct method of proof — enlarged with suitable elimination rules
for the conditional connective. The theorem proving methodology we
are going to present can be viewed as a first step towards developing
an appropriate algorithmic framework for several conditional logics for
(defeasible) conditional obligation.
Keywords: Conditional logics, tableaux.
1 Introduction
If you promised to marry Suzy Mae, then you ought to marry her, but there
is no obligation to marry her if you promised under menace of Suzy Mae’s
brothers. Your obligation is, so to speak, defeated or overridden by the additional
circumstance of your having promised under the menace of Suzy Mae’s brothers.
This amounts to saying that deontic conditionals are very often defeasible. The
distinctive mark of a defeasible conditional is that it fails both MP and monotony
(alias strengthening antecedents). For example, from the fact that A is the case,
and that it is obligatory to do B when A is the case, it follows that it is obligatory
to do B only if it further assumed that the circumstances are unexceptional, so
that your having promised under coercition does not allow us to detach that
you ought to marry Suzy Mae in spite of your having promised to do so. Since
Lewis’s classic account of counterfactuals in [Lew86], conditional logic (CL) and
its possible worlds semantics have been advocated as an appropriate tool for the
analysis of deontic conditionals (see e.g. [Mot73,Che74]. This approach has been
anticipated by [Han69,vFr72]). Lewis’s semantics makes invalid the monotony,
and in some versions also the MP, formula. For example, the failure of your
obligation to follow from your promise, given in addition that you promised
under coercition, may be explained in term of the “distance” between the (best)
possible worlds in which your promise commits you to marry Suzy Mae and the
(best of the much more distant) worlds where you promised under coercition.
Unfortunately, CLs are not particularly well suited for investigating non-
monotonic forms of inference in proof-theoretic terms. In fact, in contrast with
the striking development of CL’s semantic setting, its inferential structure has
remained largely unexplored (notable exceptions are [Tho70] and [Swa83]). Most
importantly, it has not been sufficiently explored to provide automated de-
duction methods for effectively computing non-monotonic inference relations.
We know only two attempts in this direction: Groeneboer and Delgrande’s
[GD88] and Lamarre’s [Lam92] tableau-based theorem provers for some nor-
mal CLs. Our purpose in this paper is to outline a tableau methodology for
a special fragment of CL’s language. This language is poorer than that used
in Lewis’s CLs: iterated conditional connectives are allowed only in the con-
sequent of conditional formulas. This restriction arises naturally out of the
deontic, and in general defeasible logic, literature. Almost all logics for de-
feasible conditionality use only the “flat” (i.e. non nested) part of CL, (see
e.g., [Alc93,Bel90,Bel91,Del87,Del88,Han69,KLM90,Lam91,Leh89]), and some ad-
mit iteration of the conditional connective only in the consequent of conditional
formulas (this is the case with [CT92]’s four-valued conditional logic for knowl-
edge update and [GMS96]’s treatment of hypothetical logic programming). As
we shall see, this restriction has its pros and cons. They will be discussed in
the final section (together with some open questions). In Section 2, we expound
Lewis-type semantics for deontic CLs. In Section 3 we describe a label formal-
ism adequate to represent CL’s semantics. In Section 4 we present the full proof
method and discuss some main problems.
2 Lewis’s CLs for Conditional Obligation
We begin with the language and the standard possible worlds model theory for
CL. Let L> be the language obtained from that of classical propositional logic
by adding the symbol > for the conditional connective. The set of (well-formed)
formulas of L> is defined in the usual way. If A is a formula of L>, then we
write A ∈ L>. The formal semantic interpretation of L> is in terms of system
of spheres (SOS) models. An SOS model [Lew86,Nut80] is a triple 〈W , S, υ〉
where W is a nonempty set (of possible worlds); υ is a valuation assigning to
each u in W and A ∈ L> an element from the set {T, F} (if υ(A, u) = T , then
we call u an A-world), and S is a function which assigns to each u inW a nested
set S(u) of subsets of W closed under unions and nonempty intersections (the
system of spheres of similarity around u). The intuitive idea is that, for a world
u, S(u) represents different degrees of similarity to u: if s ∈ S(u), then any
world in s is considered to be closer or more similar to u than any world not
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in s. The truth conditions for classical formulas in an SOS-model are as usual.
Let us call a sphere s ∈ S(u) containing at least an A-world an Asphere. The
rule for evaluating conditional formulas A > B is thus given by: A > B is true
at a world u iff either 1) there is no A-world in any sphere s ∈ S(u) (A > B
is vacuously true), or 2) B holds at every A-world in the smallest A-sphere in
S(u) (i.e. in every A-world closest to u). The notion of validity of a formula is
defined as usual, as truth in all worlds in all SOS-models.
In the deontic interpretation we assume that members ofW are ordered from
the standpoint of any u according to some comparative standard of (moral or
legal) evaluation. For a world u, s ∈ S(u) represents now a set of worlds evaluable
from u such that any world in s is considered to be better that any world not
in s (in the ordering) from the standpoint of u. Under this interpretation, the
conditional formula A > B is to be interpreted as “If (or given that) A, it ought
to be thatB” with (mutatis mutandis) the same truth-condition as before. Notice
that clause 2) of the above definition assumes that there is a smallest A-sphere in
S(u) (i.e., one that is included in all the others) containing the A-worlds closest
to — or, in the deontic interpretation, the best A-worlds from the standpoint of
— u. Hence no infinite sequence of better and better worlds is allowed. As it is
well known this assumption (“ limit assumption”) is highly questionable (though
it does not affect validity). Since our emphasis is not on conceptual issues, but
rather on getting an effective methodology for theorem proving in conditional
logics, we shall avoid here to discuss whether infinite sequences are a “serious
possibility”.
The class of all SOS-models characterizes Lewis’s weakest system of CL
(the system V ). In the deontic interpretation one may wish to assume one or
more of the following constraints on SOS-models. Let us call S 1) normal iff⋃
S(u) 6= ∅ for all u ∈ W (sphere systems are not empty, i.e. there is at least
one world which is evaluable from u); 2) universal iff
⋃
S(u) =W for all u ∈ W
(all worlds are evaluable from u); 3) absolute iff S(u) = S(v) for all u ∈ W
(the preference ordering is the same for all worlds). An SOS-model will be
called normal, universal, absolute according to whether S is normal, universal,
absolute. Normal, universal and absolute SOS-models characterize respectively
Lewis’s systems V N , V TU and V A. Absolute normal and absolute universal
SOS-models characterize respectively Lewis’s systems V NA and V TA. All these
systems (including V ) are proposed by Lewis as suitable for a logic of conditional
obligation. (For a more refined treatment and comparison with traditional dyadic
deontic logic see [Lew74]). It should be noticed that all the kinds of SOS-models
mentioned above fail to validate both monotony and MP for > (respectively,
(A > B) → ((A ∧ C) > B) and (A > B) → (A → B)). Let us recall that the
latter is validated by (weakly) centered SOS-models. Lewis’s reason for rejecting
such models as suitable for deontic interpretation is that on their assumption
each world would be, from its own standpoint, the best of all (or at least one of
the best) possible worlds.
Our next step will be to show how the SOS semantic model construction
just presented can be mirrored in an adequate label formalism.
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3 Label formalism and conditional semantics
In [AG94,ABGR96] we presented a labelled proof system for normal modal log-
ics, called KEM , which seems to enjoy most of the features a suitable proof
search system for modal (and in general non-classical) logics should have. In
particular, as we have argued elsewhere, it appears to be flexible enough to be
extended to cover the full range of non-classical logics which are extension of
(or logically similar to) modal logic — indeed flexible enough to be adapted to
any setting having a Kripke-model based semantics (see e.g. [AGS96]). This is
largely due to the particular label formalism it uses to generate and check mod-
els. In this section we show how this formalism can be extended, almost without
modification, to handle the semantics of CL.
As we have said the KEM approach requires us to work with “world” labels
(thereafter labels). Let ΦC = {w1, w2, . . . } and ΦV = {W1,W2, . . . } be two (non
empty) sets respectively of constant and variable world-symbols. A label in the
sense of [AG94,ABGR96] is an element of the set ℑ defined as follows:
ℑ =
⋃
1≤i
ℑi where ℑi is:
ℑ1 = ΦC ∪ ΦV ;
ℑ2 = ℑ1 × ΦC ;
ℑn+1 = ℑ1 ×ℑn.
Thus, a label is either a constant or a variable world-symbol (in which case
we speak of atomic labels), or a “structured” sequence (k′, k) of world-symbols
where (i) k′ ∈ ΦC ∪ΦV , and (ii) k ∈ ΦC or k = (m′,m) where (m′,m) is a label.
From now on we shall use i, j, k, . . . to denote arbitrary labels.
As far as Kripke models for normal modal logics are concerned, we may think
of constant and variable world-symbols as denoting respectively worlds and sets
of worlds (any world) in a Kripke model. A label of the form (k′, k) may be viewed
as representing a “world-path”. For instance, the label (W1, w1) represents a path
from w1 to the set W1 of worlds accessible from w1; (w2, (W1, w1)) represents a
path which takes us to a world w2 accessible by any world accessible from w1 (i.e.,
accessible by the sub-path (W1, w1)) according to the appropriate accessibility
relation. Thus a label of the form (k′, k) is “structurally” designed to convey
information about access between the worlds in it.
In passing from Kripke models for modal logics to SOS-models for CLs, the
format of the labels is left unchanged. The only modification is that they are now
indexed by formulas (called label formulas). For a formula A, wA1 and W
A
1 will
stand respectively for an A-world (in some A-sphere) and a set of such worlds
(any A-world in some A-sphere). The interpretation of labels of the form (k′, k)
varies accordingly. For example, the labels (wA1 , w1) and (W
A
1 , w1) can be viewed
as representing respectively an A-world and any A-world in the smallest A-sphere
around w1. Similarly, the label (w
A
2 , (W
A∨C
1 , w1)) represents an A-world in the
smallest A-sphere with respect to whatever world in the smallest A ∨ C-sphere
around w1. Such a reading is motivated by the general idea [Che75] that the
conditional A > B can be regarded as a unary operator dependent on B (i.e.
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[A >]B), from which it follows that whenever A > B is true at w1, B is true at
all A-worlds in the smallest A-sphere around w1; and whenever A > B is false
at w1, there is some A-world w
A
2 in the smallest A-sphere around w1 at which
B is false.
In KEM original approach we attached labels to signed formulas (i.e. for-
mulas of the modal language prefixed with a “T ” or “F”) to yield pairs of the
form X, i, with X a signed formula and i a label, called labelled signed formulas
(LS-formulas). Intuitively, an LS-formula, TA, i (FA, i) is intended to mean:
A is true (false) at the (last) world(s) (on the path) i; for instance, TA → B,
(W1, w1) means that A→ B is true at all the worlds (any world) accessible from
w1. The key feature ofKEM approach is that in the course of proof search labels
are manipulated in a way closely related to the semantics of modal operators
and “matched” using a specialized unification algorithm. That two labels i and k
are unifiable means, intuitively, that any world which one could get by the path
i could be reached by the path k and vice versa (equivalently, that the sets of
worlds they “denote” have a non-null intersection). For example, (w3, (W1, w1))
and (W3, (w2, w1)) are unifiable (by simultaneously linking W3 to w3 and W1 to
w2); thus they virtually represent the same path (since w3 is a world in W3 and
w2 is a world in W1). LS-formulas whose labels are unifiable turn out to be true
(false) at the same world(s) relative to the accessibility relation that holds in
the appropriate class of models. In particular two complementary LS-formulas
TA, i, FA, k (FA, i, TA, k) whose labels are unifiable stand for formulas which
are contradictory “in the same world”.
This extends immediately to CL’s semantics. For instance, a LS-formula
TC, (WA∨B1 , w1) means that C is true at all A ∨ B-worlds (any A ∨ B-world)
in the smallest A ∨B-sphere around w1. That two labels, e.g., (WA∨B1 , w1) and
(wA∨B3 , w1), are unifiable will mean that w
A∨B
3 is an A∨B-world in the smallest
A ∨ B-sphere around w1. Thus the pair of LS-formulas TC, (WA∨B1 , w1) and
FC, (wA∨B3 , w1) expresses a contradiction in the same A∨B-world in the smallest
A ∨B-sphere around w1.
To distinguish elements of labels we shall use the following terminology and
notation: given a label i = (j, k), j is said to be the head of i, denoted by h(i),
and k the body of i, denoted by b(i). By definition both h(i) and b(i) are labels,
so that we can apply recursively such notions. For example, h(b(i)) and b(b(i))
will denote respectively the head and the body of the label b(i). We shall also
call each b(i), b(b(i)), . . . a segment of i and denote it by s(i). Intuitively, s(i)
stands for a sub-path of i. The length of a label i, l(i), is the number of world
symbols it is made of. We use sn(i) to denote the segment of i whose length
is n. Similarly we shall use hn(i) to name the n-th world-symbol in the label
(counting from the right). The notion of the countersegment -n of a given label i
is defined as follows:
cn(i) = h(i)× (· · · × (hk(i)× (· · · × (hn+1(i), w0)))) (n < k < l(i))
where w0 is a “dummy” label, i.e. a label not appearing in i (the context in
which such a notion is applied will tell us what w0 stands for).
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3.1 Label unification
As we have already said, the logic-dependent notion of label (or σ-) unifica-
tion is at the heart of KEM modal proof system. In this section we define a
special notion of σ-unification for CL (let us denote it by σCL> ). Let us first
recall that a label indexed with a formula Y (of L>) is meant to denote ei-
ther a Y -world or a set of Y -worlds in some Y -sphere. Thus (W⊤1 , w1), denotes
the set of worlds (in the deontic interpretation) evaluable from w1. Notice that
W⊤ =W since ⊤ holds in all worlds. We base our notion of σCL> -unification on
the σL-unification (see [AG94,AGS96,ABGR96,Gov97] for a definition) for the
corresponding “outer” (normal) modal logic L (see [Lew86], Section 6.3, for a
list of CLs and the corresponding outer modal logics). In general, each σL has
several turning points, i.e., pairs of segments that should be matched (unified).
In order to obtain σCL> we impose some constraints on the formulas indexing
such turning points. In what follows we deal only with a very basic condition
(for certain CLs the notion of σ>-unification might require more cumbersome
conditions).
(iY , jZ)σ> = (i, j)σ
and for each turning point (i′
Y
′
, j′
Z
′
) one of the following conditions holds
– Y ′ ≡ Z ′, or
– Y ′ ≡ ⊤ and h(i) ∈ ΦV or
– Z ′ ≡ ⊤ and h(j) ∈ ΦV
We shall say that a label i extends a label k iff there exists an s(i) such that
either (i) s(i) = k or (ii) (s(i), k)σ>; and that i extends immediately k iff i
extends k and s(i) = b(i).
4 Tableaux for CLs
In this section we rely on the label formalism just presented, together with
appropriate (tableau like) inference rules, to provide a theorem proving method-
ology for a restricted fragment L−> of L> made up of (boolean combinations) of
formulas of the form A > B with no nested occurrences of > in the antecedent.
4.1 Inference rules
According to the interpretation for labels and the conditional connective ex-
pounded in the previous section the inference rules for > would turn out to be
as follows:
TA > B, i
TB, (WAn , i)
FA > B, i
FB, (wAn , i)
.
In this format, they closely resemble the KEM inference rules for the usual
(unary) modalities [AG94,ABGR96]. However, as they stand, they are mislead-
ingly straightforward. In fact, using these rules causes some information to be
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lost in the resulting proof tree (this turns out to be immediately evident if we
try to construct a KEM tree for the V axiom ((A > B) ∧ (B > A)) → ((A >
C) ≡ (B > C))). To prevent this, we have to draw conclusions from both the
declarative and the labelled part of LS-formulas. To this end we introduce the
following notation:
SA : X, iY ⇐⇒
{
X = SA or
Y = A and S = T
where S ∈ {T, F}, A, Y ∈ L−>, X is a signed formula, and i ∈ ℑ.
We are now ready to define the full set of inference rules for CL as follows.
We assume familiarity with Smullyan [Smu68] uniform notation; we write (i, j)σ
to denote both that i and j are σ-unifiable and the result of their σ-unification,
and XC to denote the conjugate of a signed formula X .
α : X, kY
αi, kY
[i = 1, 2] (α)
β : X, kY
βC3−i : X
′, jY
′
βi, (k, j)σL
[i = 1, 2] (β)
These are exactly the α and β rules of the original KEM method in a slightly
modified version (the α rules are just the usual linear branch-expansion rules of
the tableau methods, whereas the β rules correspond to such common natural
inference patterns as modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, etc.).
TA > B : X, iY
TB, (WAn , i
Y )
(T > 1)
TA > B : X, iY
TA (FB) : X ′, i′A
TB (FA), (cl(i′)−1(i′))A
(T > 2)
if i′ extends immediately i (i.e. (b(i′), i)σL) and w0 = (b(i
′), i)σL.
The presence of two rules for T > is due to the fact that true conditional formulas
behave both as α- and β-formulas (according to Smullyan classification). Note,
however, that T > 2 may result problematic for certain CLs.
FA > B, i
FB, (wAn , i)
(F >)
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X, i XC , i
[i unrestricted] (PB)
X : Y, iY
′
XC : Z, kZ′
×
[(i, k)σL] (PNC)
PB (the “Principle of Bivalence”) is exactly the “cut” rule of the original KEM
method (it represents the semantic counterpart of the cut rule of the sequent
calculus), whereas PNC (the “Principle of Non-Contradiction”) is the modified
version of the original KEM (i.e., tableau) branch-closure rule. Notice that, in
contrast with normal modal logics, in CL’s setting it may occur a contradiction
of the form FA, (wA2 , w1), since what is said by this LS-formula is that A is false
at an A-world (a world at which A is true) in the smallest A-sphere around w1.
4.2 Problems
It is easy to see, from the above definition of σ>- unification and the form
of the inference rules, what problems arise for a tableau system for CLs. We
shall examine some of them with the help of examples. Let us first consider the
following formula of L−>.
((A ∨ ¬A) > B)→ (C > B) (1)
This formula is valid. Let us suppose that it is not. Then the antecedent is true
and the consequent false. But the former is equivalent to ⊤ > B (which means
that B holds in all the ⊤-worlds in some ⊤-sphere), whereas according to the
consequent there is a C-world in the smallest C-sphere where B is false. Thus,
since a C-world is also a ⊤-world, there is a ⊤-world where B is at the same
time true and false. Let us see the KEM -tree for this formula.
1. F ((A ∨ ¬A) > B)→ (C > B) w1
2. T (A ∨ ¬A) > B w1
3. FC > B w1
4. TB (WA∨¬A1 , w1)
5. FB (wC2 , w1)
The steps from 1 to 5 are straightforward. At this point we have two comple-
mentary formulas (4 and 5), so we have to check whether they are also σ>-
complementary (i.e complementary under the σ>-unification of their labels). In
this case we have to go on with the proof, because the label formula A∨¬A has
not yet been analysed. Let D stand for the first 5 steps of the proof. Thus we
have:
6. TA (WA∨¬A1 , w1)
8. TA (WA∨¬A1 , w1)
7. FA (WA∨¬A1 , w1)
9. FA (WA∨¬A1 , w1)
D
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It is immediate to see that both branches are open, but a closer inspection of the
tree reveals that it satisfies the condition of Theorem 1 below, thus A∨¬A ≡ ⊤,
from which it follows that (WA∨¬A1 , w1) is equivalent to (W
⊤
1 , w1). This let it to
σ>-unify with (w
C
2 , w1) thus closing the tree. Alternatively we could open a tree
for the negation of all non-atomic label formulas.
Let us now consider the formula
(A ∧ ¬A) > B (2)
which holds in all the V -logics, with the corresponding tree
1. F (A ∧ ¬A) > B w1
2. FB (wA∧¬A2 , w1)
What tree have we now to develop? That for TA∧¬A or that for FA∧¬A?
According to the above remarks, we would have to develop the tree for FA∧¬A,
but in the present case this will not led us to the the desired result, since all
we learn from an open tree is that the negation of the formula is satisfiable. On
the other hand, going on with the application of the inference rules leads to the
following tree:
1. F (A ∧ ¬A) > B w1
2. FB (wA∧¬A2 , w1)
3. TA (wA∧¬A2 , w1)
4. FA (wA∧¬A2 , w1)
5.×
Another question concerns the treatment of equivalences. A common infer-
ence rule for CLs is
A ≡ B
(A > C)→ (B > C)
(3)
from which it follows
((¬A ∨B) > C)→ ((A→ B) > C) (4)
The easiest solution might seem to open an auxiliary tree each time we have to
check whether two labels unify, which means that the label formulas turn out
to be equivalent1. Indeed, this solution leads to a remarkable increase in the
complexity of proof as the following tree shows.
1. F ((¬A ∨B) > C)→ ((A→ B) > C) w1
2. T (¬A ∨B) > C w1
3. F (A→ B) > C w1
4. TC (W¬A∨B1 , w1)
5. FC (wA→B2 , w1)
1 See Section 3.1.
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Notice that the tree closes if the labels of the complementary formulas TC and
FC σ>-unify, which happens iff ¬A ∨ B is equivalent to A → B. Accordingly,
we have to open a new tree for proving their equivalence:
T¬A ∨B
FA→ B
TA
FB
TB
F¬A ∨B
TA→ B
TA
FB
TB
F (¬A ∨B) ≡ (A→ B)
4.3 The classical system KE+
The shortcomings discussed in the previous section are avoided by appealing to
the propositional proof system KE+. KE+ is based on D’Agostino and Mon-
dadori’s [DM94] KE, a tableau-like classical proof system which employs a mix-
ture of tableau, natural deduction and structural rules (in practice, the α-, β-,
PB and PNC rules of Section 4.1 restricted to the propositional part). KE+
uses the same rules but adopts a different proof search procedure which makes
it completely analytical and able to detect whether 1) a formula is either a tau-
tology, or a contradiction, or only a satisfiable one; and 2) a sub-formula of the
formula to be proved is a tautology and to use this fact in the proof of the initial
formula.
The KE+ based method consists in verifying whether the truth of the con-
jugate of an immediate sub-formula of a β-formula implies the truth of the other
immediate sub-formula. If it is so, then we have enough information to infer
that the whole formula is provable. This result follows from the fact that in a
given branch — the branch beginning with βCi (i = 1, 2) — a formula leading to
closure does not exist, i.e., there is no pair of complementary formulas. This is
obtained by proving that the conjugate of the formula occurs in the branch, i.e.,
we have to see whether a signed formula appears twice in it, and that the two
occurrences are derived from appropriate formulas. We now see how KE+ does
such a job.
4.4 Proof Search with KE+
As said before, the key feature of KE+ is that it can be used to determine
tautologicity of sub-formulas in the course of a refutation proof. To this end we
need the following definitions.
Definition 1. Each formula depends on itself. A formula B depends on A ei-
ther if it is obtained by an application of the α-rule or it is obtained by an
application of KE’s rules on formulas depending on A. A formula C depends
on A,B if it is obtained by an application of a β-rule with A,B as premises. The
formulas obtained by an application of PB depend on the formula PB is applied
to. If C depends on A,B then C depends on A and C depends on B.
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Definition 2. An α-formula is analysed in a branch when both α1 and α2 are
in the branch. A β-formula is analysed in a branch when either 1) if βC1 is in
the branch also β2 is in the branch, or 2) if β
C
2 is in the branch also β1 is in
the branch. A β formula will be called fulfilled in a branch if: 1) either β1 or β2
occurs in the branch provided they depend on β, or 2) either β1 or β2 is obtained
from applying PB on β.
Definition 3. A branch is E-completed if all the formulas occurring in it are
analysed. A branch is completed if it is E-completed and all the β-formulas
occurring in it are fulfilled.
Definition 4. We shall call a branch a βC -branch if its root is obtained by
applying PB to a β-formula and it starts with βCi . Each branch generated by an
application of PB to a formula occurring in a βC -branch is a βC -branch. Any
branch which is not a βC-branch and is obtained from an application of PB will
be called a β-branch.
Definition 5. We shall call a branch a ⊤-branch if it contains only formulas
which are equivalent to ⊤ and the formulas depending on them.
The procedure starts with the formula to be proved; then
1. it selects a βC -branch φ which is not yet completed and which is the βC -
branch with respect to the greatest number of formulas;
2. if φ is not E-completed, it expands φ by means of the α- and β-rules until
it becomes E-completed;2
3. if the resulting branch is neither completed nor closed then it selects a for-
mula of type β which is not yet fulfilled in the branch — if possible a β-
formula which results from step 2 — then it applies PB with β1, β
C
1 (or,
equivalently β2, β
C
2 ), and then it returns to step 1; otherwise it returns to
step 1.
Theorem 1. For a formula A, A ≡ ⊤ if either:
1. in one of the βC-branches it generates there is a formula which appears twice,
and one occurrence depends on βCi , i ∈ {1, 2}, and the other depends on β,
or
2. each βC-branch is closed and all the β-branches are ⊤-branches, or
3. each βC-branch is a ⊤-branch.
2 For α-formulas we do not duplicate components, i.e. if α, and αn (n = 1, 2) are in a
branch, then we add to the branch only α3−n.
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Proof. The proof follows from remarking that
tree for α tree for β n = 1, 2
α
α1
α2
β
βCn βn
β3−n
and
α = βC α1 = β
C
1 α2 = β
C
2 (5)
β = αC β1 = α
C
1 β2 = α
C
2 (6)
Thus a comparison of aKE-tree forAC [DM94] and aKE+-tree forA shows that
whenever the KE+-tree meets the conditions of the theorem the corresponding
KE-tree is closed and vice versa.
Definition 6. We define a function v which maps each formula into a set of
(atomic) formulas as follows: 1) if A is atomic, then v(A) = {A}; 2) if A
is of type α, then v(A) = v(α1) ∪ v(α2); 3) if A is of type β, then v(A) =
v(βCn )∪ v(β3−n) or v(A) = v(βn), n = 1, 2. A set of (atomic) formulas S is said
to v-fulfill a formula A iff S = v(A).
Corollary 1. Two formulas A,B are equivalent iff each set of (atomic) formu-
las which v-fulfils A v-fulfils B.
Proof. It is enough to notice that each set that v-fulfils a formula corresponds
to a truth-value assignment for the formula, and two formulas are equivalent if
they are satisfied by the same assignments.
4.5 Tableaux for CLs
Let us now analyse the tree for the formula 4 of Section 4.2 without using
auxiliary trees.
TA (wA→B2 , w1)
TB (wA→B2 , w1)
FA (wA→B2 , w1)
F ((¬A ∨B) > C)→ ((A→ B) > C) w1
T (¬A ∨B) > C w1
F (A→ B) > C w1
TC (W¬A∨B1 , w1)
FC (wA→B2 , w1)
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Obviously {TA, TB} and {FA} v-fulfill both ¬A ∨ B and A → B, therefore
(W¬A∨B1 , w1) and (w
A→B
2 , w1) σ>-unify, thus closing the tree.
We have still to examine the relations between formulas in the declarative
part of LS-formulas and label formulas. Let us consider the following formula:
((A > B) ∧ (B > A))→ ((A > C)→ (B > C)) (7)
This formula is the strong version of 3 and raises another problem of equivalence:
the equivalence of two spheres. The corresponding tree is
1. F ((A > B) ∧ (B > A))→ ((A > C)→ (B > C)) w1
2. T (A > B) ∧ (B > A) w1
3. F (A > C)→ (B > C) w1
4. TA > B w1
5. TB > A w1
6. TA > C w1
7. FB > C w1
8. FC (wB2 , w1)
9. TB (WA1 , w1)
10. TA (WB2 , w1)
11. TC (WA3 , w1)
Notice that the formulas 9 and 10 in the above tree fulfill 4 and 5, from which
the conditional equivalence of A and B in w1 follows. We therefore need the
following rule for detecting this fact,
TA, iB
TB, jA
X, iA
if h(i), h(j) ∈ ΦV and (b(i), b(j))σL.3
As regard the application of the method to conditional formulas allowing
iteration of the conditional connective in the consequent, it suffices to remark
that conditional formulas cannot occur as label formulass, and thus they do not
play any roˆle in σ>-unifications.
5 Discussion and open problems
In this paper we have discussed a tableau methodology for building a computa-
tionally efficient tableau proof system for CLs. [GD88] and [Lam92] are already
steps in this direction. Groeneboer and Delgrande [GD88] present a method for
constructing Kripke models for CL which generalizes Hughes and Cresswell’s
[HC68] method of semantic diagrams for the modal logic S4.3 to Delgrande’s
[Del87] conditional logic NP . This extension is made possible by the corre-
spondence between S4.3 and NP [Bou94]. However, to exploit this correspon-
dence (via Kripke models for normal modal logics), we have to consider only
3 See Section 3.1 for a similar consideration.
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the flat part of NP ; conditional formulas allowing iterated conditionals in the
consequent are excluded. Moreover, being an extension of Hughes and Cresswell
[HC68]’s classic method of semantic diagrams for modal logics, Groeneboer and
Delgrande’s approach can be said to suffer of all the well-known computational
drawbacks of the tableau method.
Lamarre [Lam92] takes a more direct approach by relying on SOS-models.
However, his method requires the input formulas to be in “normal disjunctive
form”. This is a serious shortcoming, since normal forms are not generally avail-
able outside classical logic. On the contrary, the method we have proposed pro-
vides a uniform proof-theoretical treatment of CLs without normal-forming and,
unlike [GD88]’s method, it does not require much declaratively expressed heuris-
tic to improve efficiency in the various steps of the procedure.
In conclusion we wish to discuss some main sources of difficulties. According
to [Alc96] a first problem with Lewis’s systems is the world-relative character
of their SOS formal semantic models. As has been pointed out by Alchourro´n
“obligations are not world-relative but person-relative, and like defeasible con-
ditionals, they require a person-relative construction”. However, there should be
no difficulties, in principle, to modify our approach so to adapt it to a person-
relative construction of the logic of defeasible conditional obligation.
Another source of difficulties is that all Lewis’s CLs for conditional obligation
validate the deontically counterintuitive formula A > A (“A is obligatory given
that A is the case”). According to both [Alc96] and [Mak93] this difficulty can be
bypassed by introducing some temporal ordering to make obligations future to
their conditions. Unfortunately, this goes beyond Lewis’s semantic equipment for
CLs. Nevertheless we could introduce temporal distinctions in Lewis’s seman-
tics by holding the temporal interpretation of SOS-models (as future temporal
systems of spheres) advanced in [Lew86], Section 5.2, together with their usual
deontic interpretation and modifying accordingly the truth conditions for > and
our label formalism (e.g., by further labelling worlds with future time point or
interval parameters). In this way, we could have A true in a world v after u but
false in some of the best A-worlds before u.
The most important source of difficulties has been scarcely discussed (see
e.g. [Bou94,Mak93]). It comes from the fact that, as we have already said, most
approaches to the logic of deontic, and in general defeasible, conditionality are
restricted to “unnested” conditionals. In the AI & Law field this arises as a conse-
quence of the fact that current non-monotonic or defeasible formalisms treat con-
ditional obligation as a normal default (see e.g. [Hor94,Mak94,Pra93,TvT94]).
However, perfectly understandable examples of nested conditionals occur both in
ordinary language and in legal contexts. For example, judicial reasoning makes
often use of the “weak” MP formula (A ∧ (A > B)) > B to detach B in cir-
cumstances in which A and A > B hold without known defeating conditions.
Formulas with nested conditionals in the antecedent of this kind raise difficulties
for traditional default formalisms. As we have said from the beginning, our ap-
proach suffers from the same weakness (though it is able to treat formulas with
nested conditionals in the consequent).
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A strictly related difficulty is that we can prove soundness and completeness
of our method for the fragment L−> of L> only by suspending the validity of the
RCEA inference rule for normal CLs (from A ≡ B to infer (A > C) ≡ (B > C)),
or by restricting it to the propositional case (i.e. A, B are conditional-free for-
mulas). However, there are good reasons for rejecting RCEA in its usual, unre-
stricted formulation. Nute [Nut80], Ch. 2, has already argued for the inadequacy
of RCEA for ordinary language conditionals. We believe that legal contexts offer
further evidence of this inadequacy. For RCEA commits us to a truth-functional
view of the “sameness of content” of two formulas A and B whereas, in con-
trast with classical propositional truths, conditional norms are states-of-affairs
dependent (i.e., they have a non-null information content). Let us assume that a
normative system can be conceived of as a logical theory, with the norms acting
as its proper axioms4. On this view two (conditional) norms in it would be log-
ically valid and thus truth-functionally equivalent. Let us further suppose that
a normative system contains three norms A > B, C > D and (A > B) > E.
From RCEA we could then obtain (C > D) > E, in spite of the fact that the
content (or the “field of application”) of A > B might be incompatible with, or
inappropriate with respect to, that of C > D and E.
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